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Abstract: This paper analyses the impact of "Everything but Arms" (EBA) initiative on the 
European Union (EU) sugar production, trade and agricultural income using the regionalised 
agricultural sector modelling system “CAPRI”. The CAPRI model distinguishes a supply and a 
spatial multi-commodity market module that interact iteratively. The supply module contains 
200 non-linear regional programming models, each representing production patterns of 30 crop 
and 15 animal activities at NUTS II level. Trade flows in the market module between 13 world 
regions and the EU are endogenously determined. The impact analysis shows that the EU 
welfare and agricultural income is negatively but moderately affected by the EBA initiative due 
to the small relative importance of sugar beet in agriculture as a whole. EU sugar supply, trade 
and regional distribution of sugar production are significantly affected while EU sugar demand 
remains unchanged. As expected EU sugar imports increase from the LDCs while EU sugar 
exports decrease.  The quota and duty free access for LDCs plays a major role for the captured 
products.   
1 Introduction 
Protection of the sugar sector against imports has a long tradition in Europe, going back to the 
blockage of imports into the Napoleonian Europe.  Export subsidies were granted to German 
sugar beet growers already in the 1870s in indirect form and collusion has been recognised 
among German producers of the 1890s, supported by the first quota regime in 1896 
(Teichmann 1955: 331-346).  Despite intermediate periods of relative liberalisation, the sugar 
sub-sector evolved to be arguably the most protected agricultural sub-sector in Germany in the 
1960s when decisions on the European Union (EU) sugar Common Market Organisation 
(CMO) were made.  Quota systems of various forms were operated in the other five EU 
founder members as well, but some of these countries, in particular France, were more 
competitive than Germany and had vested interests in their exports.  The EU sugar CMO of 
1967 resulted from a compromise among the different interests of the first six EU Member 
States (Bujard 1974).  The compromise combined exceptionally high internal intervention 
prices for sugar closed to the former German level with a production quota system protecting 
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less efficient producers such as those in Italy and Germany at the time, while offering export 
possibilities to more competitive producers such as those in France.  The quota system 
distinguishes an "A" quota receiving full price support through the intervention price which is, 
however, discounted by a 2% producer levy, and a "B" quota receiving substantially lower 
price support due to a maximum of 39.5% producer levy being charged on the intervention 
price.  Any quantities sold beyond the combined A and B quotas and called "C" sugar have to 
be exported at international prices without refund (see details in Commission of the European 
Communities 2003a). 
The first implication of this quota system is that, apart from C sugar production, market shares 
of the EU Member States which actually resulted form a delicate political compromise, may 
considerably deviate from those that would prevent from comparative advantage (Linde et al. 
2000, Chapter 15).  The second implication is that, because of their resulting granted 
monopsonic position, sugar refineries are likely to exercise market power towards beet growers 
as well as sugar users at the regional level.  Third, the conjecture of C sugar production being 
cross-subsidised from the quota system and, hence, induced trade distortions are likely to be 
suspected as recently shown by the current dispute settlement panel launched by Australia, 
Brazil and Thailand at the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  Fourth, one political driving 
force to reform is missing.  Because A and B levies finance most of the sugar export refunds to 
dispose sugar surpluses on third markets and, hence, make the sugar CMO self-financing, 
budget constraints are not likely to motivate reform in this sub-sector unlike in the other 
heavily subsidised sub-sectors. 
High EU support prices require an accompanying tariff protection which has been consistently 
prohibitive apart for imports of raw sugar from the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries and India to which a preferential access at zero (or very low) tariffs has been renewed 
under the Sugar Protocol of the Cotonou Convention and the India Agreement.  For many 
years, these preferential imports have been re-exported with export subsidies financed not 
through the producer levies but the EU budget.  Despite the budgetary costs of these re-exports, 
reform proposals aimed at aligning the high EU internal prices to the world level are generally 
opposed with the claim that it would deprive exports from these developing countries of high 
EU internal prices. 
Effective lobbying from the part of beet grower and sugar refinery professional organisations 
facilitated by the concentration of business interests on a relative small sub-sector was 
successful to thwart any significant reforms of the sugar CMO since its inception.  Sugar price 
 4 
fluctuations on the world market may have, moreover, lent some credibility to keep EU internal 
prices disconnected from outside.  Without considering additional reasons, we may simply 
observe that the sugar CMO largely withstood the 1992 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
reform, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay round agreement on 
agriculture, the 1998 Agenda 2000 decisions and, finally, the June 2003 Luxembourg 
agreement on revising Agenda 2000. 
However, two recent developments in trade relations have opened the possibility of 
fundamental reform.  The first development lays in the 2001 “Everything But Arms” (EBA) 
concession of the EU to the 48 least developed countries (LDC) allowing free and unlimited 
imports from the beneficiary countries, after a transition period ending in 2009 for banana, rice 
and sugar.  If the currently negotiated “Economic Partnership Agreements” (EPA) with ACP 
countries includes equivalent concessions, additional sugar imports into the EU might also be 
triggered.  These concessions are likely to stimulate a considerable surge in imports requiring 
equivalent cuts in EU quotas to comply with the Uruguay round agreement commitments on 
export subsidises.  The second driving force is the likely curent WTO panel ruling that may 
enforce a major reform of the sugar CMO.  In addition, the current WTO round is likely to 
impose additional EU commitments on the conventional themes of internal support, market 
access and export subsidies.  Another driving force might have been the decade-long criticism 
of the sugar CMO for its various inefficiencies from external studies (e.g., Bujard 1974, Linde 
et al. 2000) but also for its alleged impediments to competitiveness against the principle of the 
single market from the European Court of Auditors (1991, 2001). 
In addition to these recent external pressures, internal pressures to reform the sugar CMO are 
accelerating too.  With the 2003 Luxembourg agreement fundamentally switching to a single 
direct payment to support most of the agricultural sub-sectors in the near future, the sugar sub-
sector is one important sub-sector left without reform, still benefiting from high internal prices, 
import barriers and export subsidies and, hence, increasingly seen as a relic of the old CAP in 
conflict with the Sustainable Development Strategy expressed by the EU.  European non-
governmental organisations which generally enjoy a favourable opinion for their stances in 
favour to poor countries, increasingly voice against the absurdities of the EU sugar subsidies 
showing in particular how the sugar regime enriches a small group of European farmers and 
large sugar refiners at the expense of the world's poorest (Oxfam, 2004). 
As a result of these mounting pressures funnelling from different origins and supported by 
several well-documented academic studies, the Commission of the European Communities 
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(2003b) has proposed in September 2003 three options to reform the sugar regime.1  The first 
option called "status-quo" consists in preserving the current sugar CMO but adjusting its 
system of trade barriers, domestic sugar prices and production quotas according to the various 
EU international commitments already agreed or agreed in the future.  The second option called 
"price cut" consists in, first, lowering the domestic sugar price and the non-preferential import 
tariffs and, then, eliminating progressively the production quotas.  European beet growers 
would be compensated from the beet price cut by a direct payment that would be partly or 
entirely integrated into the Luxembourg agreement's single farm payment while it is not clear 
how the least competitive sugar producing developing countries benefiting from high European 
sugar prices due to their preferential access would be treated.  The third option called 
"liberalisation" consists in eliminating the current system of price support and production 
quotas of the sugar CMO and compensating the European beet growers with a decoupled direct 
farm payment. 
Within the background of the upcoming implementation of the Luxembourg agreement, this 
paper analyses the impact of the EBA agreement reflecting the EC's "status-quo" option that 
triggers a certain reduction of production quotas to cope with expectable additional imports.  
We further mimic the elimination of export subsidies for sugar by reducing production quotas 
additionally.  This analysis relies on simulations performed with the regionalised agricultural 
sector modelling system "CAPRI" that is adjusted to deal with these different scenarios. 2  
The following second section reminds the major features of the EU sugar industry to derive in 
particular internal price linkages between the EU beet and sugar markets.  Section 3 focuses on 
the trade instruments of the EU sugar CMO to derive their modelling.  Section 4 reviews in 
more detail various hypotheses to explain sugar beet farmers’ behaviour.  Section 5 specifies 
the simulation scenarios, enlightens key results, compares them with those from other studies 
and draws implications for the EU sugar sub-sector and trading partners.  Section 6 provides 
conclusions and limitations of the study. 
                                                 
1  An option called "fixed quota" of maintaining the current system of production quota and implementing tariff 
rate quotas (TRQ) for developing countries covered by the ACP and EBA concessions was removed from the last 
European Commission's proposal (see Commission of the European Communities 2003c).  However, this option 
might return on the table again. 
2 A short description of the CAPRI model is given in the Annex. 
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2 Key features of the EU sugar industry 
The first key feature of the EU sugar sub-sector lays in its strong dependence on administrative 
prices, export subsidies, import tariffs and production quotas.  Because export subsidies are 
specified according to the sugar intervention price, they tend to set a price floor for EU sugar 
markets.  In turn, applied import tariffs define the upper ceiling for EU sugar prices.  The quota 
system limits the options to sell or export at high EU prices.  A minimum sugar beet price is 
derived from the sugar intervention price allowing for notional processing margins.  This 
minimum beet price provides a price floor for refinery contracts with beet growers.  Actual 
refinery margins are, however, frequently higher than notional margins because EU market 
prices exceed intervention prices by some 10% and actual processing costs are not as high as 
assumed in the defined processing margins.  This strong dependence on policy decisions 
implies, first, that rent seeking is highly rewarding for the industry.  Together with the 
oligopolistic structure of sugar markets, see below, it also implies that it might be undesirable 
for the sugar industry to publicly reveal unbiased data on processing costs or sugar prices.  
Even though highly relevant for modelling, this information is difficult to come by.  The lack of 
statistical information on wholesale sugar prices is symptomatic for our knowledge of this 
sector.  Instead, we have to rely on survey information from industrial sugar users, reproduced 
in Linde et al. (2000), which may be considered the best available for modelling purposes, even 
though the sugar users might be affected by interests opposite to those of the sugar industry. 
The second key feature is the quota system that severely limits competition of sugar refineries 
for beet growers and sugar buyers (Blume et al. 2002).  With respect to growers, sugar 
refineries may be considered as regional monopsonists (Schmidt 2003).  National markets are 
usually served by one to three refineries, which frequently have their main operating regions.  
The above mentioned price differential between the intervention and market prices is usually 
attributed to collusion among refineries, which agree not to interfere outside their designated 
markets.  Using illustrative simulations based on UK data, McCorriston (2002: 366) finds that 
price transmission of a 30% farm level price cut in the sugar sector would be reduced to about 
80% and welfare benefits to consumers to 60-70% of the perfect competition case. 
Third, a number of studies of the EU sugar industry have included an analysis of the primal 
technology and cost function, notably those relying on programming models (Walkenhorst 
2001, Mahler 1994, Render 1989) but also others (Schmidt 2003).  The upshot of these studies 
is that fixed capital is an important cost element, amounting to about 65% of processing cost 
and leading to strongly decreasing average costs up to a capacity of about 10,000 tons beyond 
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which the average cost curve tends to become fairly flat.  If variable cost only amounts to some 
35% of total processing cost, it is frequently profitable to sugar factories to use its capacity 
completely, at least in the short run when capital cost may be considered sunk cost.  However, 
when deciding on reinvestment of old equipment, say every 15 years, more complete cost 
coverage is required for continued operation of the plant.  These technological features explain 
why the sugar industry, made up of hundreds of sugar refineries, is likely to adjust slowly to a 
drop in sugar prices and why seemingly unprofitable processing, for instance of C sugar, may 
be continued for a long time.  On the other hand, the number of sugar refineries in EU-15 has 
declined from 209 to 143 in a decade from 1992 to 2002 (Bartens, Mosolff 2003: 30) with 
moderate pressure on the sugar industry to increase efficiency, indicating that the sunk cost 
impediment to adjustment should not be overrated.  
Fourth, the sugar industry has to cope with uncertainty on sugar yields and international sugar 
prices.  The carry forward possibilities for C sugar allowed by the sugar CMO may help 
smooth out yield fluctuations which would, otherwise, threaten the entire use of the quota for 
both the beet growers and the sugar refineries.  Because yield fluctuations are, however, more 
relevant at the farm level whose beet production is bound to a specific single location than at 
the refinery level, beet growers may have precautionary motives to produce some C sugar beets 
if storage costs are born by the refinery. 
These features also explain the considerable heterogeneity found in the inter-professional 
relationships between the sugar industry and beet grower organisations across the Member 
States.  Inter-professional relationships are specified partly in the “inter-trade agreements”, 
partly in individual contracts although they may also be of a purely informal nature.  When beet 
growers hold shares of the sugar company (e.g., Südzucker), relationships are quite different 
too.  First of all, payment schemes for beets differ across Member States.  Apparently, 
refineries in only six Member States (Germany, Austria, France, Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland) apply the classical A, B, C discriminatory system whereas refineries in the other 
Member States offer to beet growers pooled prices at least for all quota beets, including in them 
even a part of C beet in the Netherlands.  A pooled price system increases the incentive to fill 
entirely the farm level quota and, consequently, sugar production in these countries (Combette 
et al. 1997: 5).  Refineries in Germany and Austria have introduced a third allotment so called 
"C1" that represents 5 to 10% of the A quota and receives prices between those of the B 
allotment and those of the so called "C2" allotment, which receives very low prices (Schmidt 
2003: 14).  This additional kink in the farm level demand function for beets triggers some C 
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beet production from beet growers who would not produce for C2 prices.  Finally, sugar 
refineries apparently distribute a volume of beet delivery rights to farmers that is greater than 
the one corresponding to their own sugar quota (Schmidt 2002: 32), a strategy which again 
tends to increase sugar production.  The exceeding volumes of these delivery rights are 
unknown.  
Although the derivation of the minimum A and B beet prices from the sugar intervention price 
are specified by the sugar CMO, the prevalence of various premiums for quality, payments for 
pulp, allowances for transport cost, etc. leads to consider the total beet price, inclusive of all 
supplements, to be a choice variable for refineries.  For modelling purpose, a monopsony or 
oligopsony approach (Lotze 1998, Chapter 6) is recommended.  However, the tight political 
constraints imposed on refinery choices over prices and quantities in the sugar CMO would add 
considerable complexity to this approach.  Other studies have relied on explicit assumptions on 
the behaviour of beet prices, which is then included in the scenario definitions (Walkenhorst 
2001: 67, Schmidt 2002: 58-59, Frandsen et al. 2003: 6).  
In this paper, the linkage between each sugar beet price and market sugar price is based on a 
reduced form equation linking the farm-gate price of a type of sugar to the relevant derived 
revenue from sugar and molasses, taking into account the applicable levy.  The parameters are 
calibrated to reproduce estimated differences between the farm-gate A, B and C beet prices and 
market sugar price observed in the base period while being consistent with an average beet 
price derived from the Eurostat Economic Agricultural Accounts (EAA). 
Two other aspects of the sugar industry behaviour are now addressed.  Depending on the inter-
trade agreement between beet growers and sugar refineries, delivery rights to growers may be 
cut down after successive under-deliveries not due to "force majeure".  In Ireland, for example, 
the shortfall clause is stricter (Irish Farmers Journal 2003) whereas, in Germany, no such clause 
usually exists (Schmidt 2003: 18).  Even without an equivalent clause in the inter-trade 
agreement, a beet grower may fear the risk of permanently losing, for example, 10% of his 
delivery quota once the inter-trade agreement is renewed the following year.  Such fear may 
evidently contribute to explain the widespread production of C sugar in almost all Member 
States.  The modelling of such risk as well as some other risks is addressed in Section 4. 
A second issue is the transferability of delivery rights among beet growers.  Usually, such 
transfers are possible within the same delivery basin but require the approval of the refinery.  
Sometimes, the transfers need to be accompanied with land or company shares.  Limits 
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imposed on quota trade induce well-documented efficiency loss (Bureau et al. 1997) and have 
implications for appropriate modelling that is addressed in Section 4. 
3 Characteristics and modelling of sugar trade  
Trade in sugar is arguably one of the most distorted of all commodities with many countries 
applying policy instruments designed to directly impact on trade.  As a result of these 
widespread interventions, the international sugar market is often said to have a “residual” 
character with high volatility that serves in turn as an argument for continued policy 
intervention.  However, volatility and policy interventions apparently eased since the beginning 
of the 80s, mainly as a result of the recession in the share of highly distorted trade flows 
(Borrell, Pearce 1999: 10-11).  Uruguay round commitments contributed little so far to 
discipline interventionist policies. 
An important exception for the EU is the limit on the value of export subsidies that is 
increasingly constraining EU policy (Meijl, Tongeren 2002: 461).  EU protection against 
imports stays prohibitive at almost any international sugar price due to a very high trigger price 
being notified to the WTO for application of the safeguard clause.  However, in 2000/02, about 
1.7 million tons of preferential imports, mostly from ACP countries, entered the EU at zero or 
very low tariffs.  In addition, the above mentioned EBA initiative will grant preferential access 
to a second country group up to their entire domestic production potential.  Because bilateral 
tariff rate quotas (TRQs) constitute an important policy instrument for the EU, they need to be 
explicitly represented if far reaching policy options, such as dismantling of the EU sugar CMO, 
are to be considered.  While such explicit treatment was achieved with the general equilibrium 
GTAP framework in Frandsen et al. (2003), this study uses a version of the CAPRI model with 
a spatial multi-commodity market module to cover bilateral trade flows and associated TRQs.  
The discontinuity implied by a TRQ regime is approximated with a smooth non-linear function 
characterised by a strong curvature (Liapis, Britz 2001).  In addition, sugar is considered 
imperfectly substitutable between domestic and foreign origins through an Armington approach 
as in Frandsen et al. (2003).  
The standard CAPRI market module is, however, not adequately suited to simulate the impact 
of the EBA initiative because the country group of the 48 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
that benefit from the EU trade concessions is not explicitly modelled as one regional aggregate 
in contrast to Henrichsmeyer et al. (2003a).  Most LDCs are spread across the regional ACP 
country aggregate, the regional free trade developing country (CAD) aggregate and the rest of 
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the world (ROW) aggregate.  Because the aggregation of the 48 LDCs in one regional 
aggregate in the market module was not feasible within the scope of this paper, we proceed as 
following. 
In a first step, we feign that EBA is granted to the three regional ACP, CAD and ROW 
aggregates that include, in particular, the 48 LDCs.  Because of the resulting EU sugar import 
over-estimation, EU sugar imports from each regional aggregate are, then, corrected by 
subtracting from them the increase in imports whose origin is allegedly attributed to non LDCs 
belonging to the regional aggregate, as illustrated in the following equation for the ACP 
aggregate:   
( )1 0 1 0EU ACP EU ACP nonLDCinACP EU ACP EU ACPIMP IMP s IMP IMP− − − −= − −  
IMPEU-ACP is the corrected import volume of sugar from ACP countries to the EU taking into 
account that some of them benefited from the EBA initiative.  The index 1 stands for the result 
of the 1st step and the index 0 for the base period of 1998-2001.  The share s0nonLDCinACP is the 
share of exports of non-LDCs included in the ACP aggregate in exports of all countries 
included in the ACP aggregate, all destinations included, for the base period.  A similar 
treatment is performed for exports of non-LDCs included in the CAD and ROW aggregates.  
This approximation of sugar exports of regional aggregates that include LDCs has several 
implicit hypotheses.  First, supply elasticities of LDCs within an aggregate are assumed to be 
the same as the supply elasticities of non-LDCs within the same aggregate.  Second, export 
shares of non-LDCs in exports of all countries belonging to the same aggregate are assumed to 
be the same in the base period whatever the destination.  Third, exports of non-LDCs to the EU 
are prevented to vary in the simulation scenarios, implying no room for diversion effect in 
detriment to non-LDCs. 
In a second step, we impose for those three aggregates a TRQ, amounting the so calculated 
imports with preferential tariffs equal to zero and prohibitive out quota tariffs.  Then, the 
market module is solved again to make sure that the market equilibrium correctly reflects the 
implementation of the EBA initiative solely granted to the LDCs and not to all the countries of 
the aggregates.   
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4 Representing sugar beet grower supply behaviour  
The standard microeconomic assumption on farmer behaviour is profit maximisation. Frandsen 
et al. (2003) show the implication of profit maximisation under the current sugar CMO that 
Figure 1 illustrates. 
Figure 1 Five different farm types in view of the EU sugar CMO 
A  quota B quota
P A
P B
P C
Sugar beet production (X )
M C AUnd M C AB ind
M C BB ind
M C B Und
M C CProd
X 1 X 2 X 4X 3 X 5
Beet prices
 
 Source: Own calculations 
Principally, one can imagine five different producer types defined according to their marginal 
cost (MC) curve.  The first type of A quota under-fillers (Aund) has marginal costs equal to the 
A beet price.  The second type of A quota binders (Abind) has marginal costs that lie in 
between the A and B beet prices.  The third type of B quota under-fillers (Bund) produces at 
marginal costs equal to the B beet price and the fourth type of A and B binders (Bbind) at 
marginal costs in between B and C beet prices.  Finally, the fifth type of C producers (Cprod) is 
assumed to produce at marginal costs equal to the C beet price. 
Frandsen et al. (2003) allocate each EU Member State to one of these five producer groups.  
This procedure, however, neglects the possibility that more than one producer type exists at the 
country level although it is likely that at least the last three producer types have members in 
each country. 
Estimations of the share of producer types show that a major part of all EU sugar beet farms 
belongs to the C producer type (Cprod).  Relying on profit maximisation alone would have two 
troublesome implications: 
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1. Marginal costs including opportunity cost of land of many supposedly efficient beet farms 
would have to be very low compared to expectations by farm management specialists. 
2. The vast majority of C beet producing farms would hardly respond to changes in the prices 
for quota beets, or to changes in quota endowments since the only relevant variable at the 
margin would be the C beet price. 
This further implies to consider behavioural hypotheses that go beyond the simple profit 
maximisation hypothesis. 
1. To reconcile the low C beet price with observed C beet supply, it is frequently alleged that 
fixed costs are born by quota beets alone while C beet supply only covers variable cost 
(Schmidt 2003).  While this is a plausible explanation for the short run, beet growers should 
be incline to reduce their farm capacity in the long run if the C beet price permanently falls 
short of full cost coverage.   
2. The simple profit maximisation problem should also be modified to account for the 
discontinuity in land allocation to reflect the incentive to grow single plots entirely with a 
single crop.  In the case of sugar beet, this incentive is likely to be important because 
suppliers of harvesting services charge a lower price per ha the larger the plot size is to the 
point that they refuse to harvest plots of very small size.   
3. An alternative explanation to this puzzle incorporates yield uncertainty in the expected 
marginal revenue function of sugar beet.  Whereas the deterministic marginal revenue 
function has two single sharp kinks, the calculation of an expected marginal revenue 
amounts to smooth out these kinks since neighbouring values of a given production is 
incorporated according to their probability weight in the estimation of the expected 
marginal revenue of that particular production.  This boils down to explain growing C beet 
as an insurance strategy against revenues foregone in case of poor harvests.  By the same 
token, it reduces the implausible unresponsiveness of C beet growers to quota beet prices 
and endowments mentioned above.  Nonetheless, some questions remain.  Beet farms with 
high production levels would still be very insensitive to quota beet prices unless they 
calculate with extremely high yield variation.  For the beet farms whose C beet production 
exceeds by 20% their quota, yield uncertainty is not an entirely convincing explanation for 
C beet production.  Furthermore, beet farms have still some possibilities to shift their quota 
use across years using the carry forward mechanism. 
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4. Given yield uncertainty and the consequent expected profit uncertainty from sugar beet 
production, it is natural to consider now “true” risk aversion, placing an additional value on 
the stability of profits in addition to their expected value.  If stability is measured in terms 
of a low variance, these two objectives may be depicted as in Figure 2 (compare Schmidt 
2003) based on a normal distribution of yields.3  
Figure 2: Expected profit and variance as a function of sugar beet production relative to 
quota endowment 
0
12000
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
Production/Quota
0
70000expected profit
variance of profits
 
Source: Own calculations 
   
The variance is first increasing because yields are multiplied with an increasing area at high 
(quota) revenues.  At a certain point, C beet production occurs and reduces the variance 
because higher production is associated with lower prices.  This variance reducing effect is 
dominated by the variance increasing effect of an increasing beet area at a certain point.  
Given some degree of risk aversion, optimal behaviour is located between the maximum of 
the expected profit function and the minimum of the variance.  Consequently, true risk 
aversion may explain C beet production beyond the maximum of expected profit.  
However, to explain high C beet production in a number of Member States (e.g., in France, 
Germany, United Kingdom and Austria), the variance of profits at the observed production 
is very close to its minimum, implying an implausibly high degree of risk aversion.4 
                                                 
3  As we do not want to draw quantitative conclusions, we leave the ordinate axis without units.  Quantitative 
results, not the shapes of the functions, strongly depend on the quota endowments, beet prices, expected sugar 
yields and their coefficients of variation.  Expected profits additionally depend on the farm specific cost function 
for sugar beets.  In Figure 2, constant marginal costs are assumed.  Note that uncertainty in C beet prices is not 
included therein.  
4  This explanation holds even more with the inclusion of price uncertainty for C beets, an inclusion which would 
move the minimum of the variance to the left.  
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5. As already mentioned in Section 2, it is known from some Member States (e.g., from 
Germany) that sugar refineries often distribute somewhat higher beet delivery rights to beet 
growers than corresponding to their own quotas.  In this case, the aggregate C beet 
production as perceived from the growers’ perspective is smaller than the quantity inferred 
from national statistics.  Unfortunately, the relevance of this practice in the EU countries is 
difficult to assess.  
6. An additional motive to produce C beet lays in the expectation that future farm level quota 
cuts may be smaller if C beet production is high, an expectation which might be encouraged 
by the sugar industry as mentioned in Section 2.  Conversely, beet growers may even hope 
to receive additional quota rights from the sugar industry if some delivery rights are 
redistributed among beet farms.  Both of these considerations imply that a ton of C beet 
may include a speculative value for beet farms on the top of the market price for C beet. 
Looking at those different explanations of a C beet supply greater than expected under simple 
profit maximisation, it becomes apparent that the effects of each motive are difficult to 
anticipate quantitatively.  Beneath the distinction of producer types, yield uncertainty is 
explicitly included in the CAPRI supply module by replacing the profit function for sugar beet 
by an expected profit function based on normally distributed yields with estimated standard 
deviations.  The first order condition for sugar beet supply is a marginal cost that is no longer 
equal to a respective price but equal to expected marginal revenue.  Figure 3 provides an 
illustration. 
Figure 3 Expected marginal revenue function of beet production under yield uncertainty 
A  q u o ta B  q u o ta
P A
P B
P C
S u g a r  b ee t p ro d u ctio n  (X )
B ee t p r ic es
E x p e cted  m a rg in a l r ev en u e
 
Source: Own calculations 
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The expected marginal revenue equals the A beet price if production is only a fraction of the A 
quota and reaches the C beet price if production is considerable above the A and B quotas.  In 
between these two extreme values, there is a smooth transition in expected marginal revenue.  
The shape of the transition curve depends on quota endowments, yield and its variation, and 
beet prices.  The use of expected profits in the CAPRI supply module makes quota restrictions 
superfluous because they are implicitly included.  
As mentioned above, many beet growers are found with an expected marginal revenue and, in 
turn, a marginal cost almost equal to the C beet price at the observed supply volume.  A 
comparison of marginal costs implied by this procedure with some estimates of opportunity 
costs from Bureau et al. (1997) also confirms that expected profit maximisation solely as well 
as simple profit maximisation imply marginal costs of a very low level at least for the Cprod 
producer type.  To reflect that marginal costs are probably higher due to the above mentioned 
motive to produce additional amounts of sugar beets, a virtual quota mark up is defined such 
that the expected marginal revenue function equals the opportunity cost of sugar beet 
production estimated by Bureau et al. (1997) at the observed supply level.  As shown in   
Figure 4, the expected marginal revenue (EMR) function is simply moved to the right (EMR0 to 
EMR1).  The virtual quota mark up is defined relative to the actual quota and is tackled as a 
constant value.  The quota rent of this mark up can be interpreted similarly as an insurance that 
beet growers pay for the motive explained above.  The marginal cost MCB corresponds to the 
opportunity cost estimated by Bureau et al. (1997) for beet supply which is assumed to be the 
correct one at the observed supply X0.  While the actual quota endowment is at QA+B, we 
envisage that the beet grower behaves as if his quota endowment is at Q*A+B.  This procedure 
guarantees that the EMR function is relatively steep at the observed supply level, which in turn 
leads to a stronger response to quota and price changes.  This procedure is repeated for every 
NUTS 2 region where sugar beets are grown for each producer type existing there.  
Unfortunately, Bureau et al. (1997) do not provide estimates for all sugar producing NUTS 2 
regions in the EU and neither do they distinguish different producer types.  How gaps are filled 
in and how marginal costs are determined for the different technologies are explained in the 
Annex. 
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Figure 4 Determination of virtual quota mark ups  
PA
PB
PC
Sugar beet 
production
Beet prices
Xo
MCB
QA QA+B
Q*A Q*A+B
EMR0 EMR1
 
Source:  Own calculations 
To allow for possible transfers of delivery rights among regions of the same Member State 
when these rights are not filled at the regional level, and avoid an awkward simulation outcome 
where some Member States end up supplying C sugar without fulfilling their A and B quotas, 
the sugar module includes an accounting balance at the national level that counts sugar supply 
first as sugar quotas A and B and then as C sugar. 
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5 Empirical analysis of Reform Options  
Besides the reference scenario, two reform scenarios are assessed in this study: (1) the 
"Everything But Arms" (EBA) initiative, and (2) the EBA initiative with progressive reduction 
of production quota to phase out export subsidies.  These scenarios are implemented for the 
year 2009 at constant 2001 prices. 
Following a brief presentation of their main features, the impact of these scenarios on supply, 
demand, trade and prices within the EU are shown and discussed.  The results from scenario 2 
are compared to those from scenario 1, which are compared in turn to those from the reference 
scenario.   
5.1 Layout and implementation of the scenarios 
Reference scenario 
This section briefly presents the most important features of the reference scenario, referred as 
"2003 CAP reform".  This reference scenario reflects the new CAP reform of 26 June 2003.  
The stated objectives of this reform include distribution of agricultural income, promotion of 
good agricultural practices in marginal agricultural areas, simplification of the CAP operation, 
facilitation of the process of eastward enlargement of the EU and defence of the CAP in the 
WTO negotiation (CEC, 2002b).   
The main measures of the 2003 CAP reform include an adoption of a single decoupled direct 
payment, a reduction of administrative prices and a payment modulation system.  The most 
important measure is the substitution by beginning in 2005 of a ‘single payment per farm’ for 
the different direct payments or premium currently received.  Such single farm payments are 
calculated on the basis of ‘a reference amount in a reference period 2000-2002’.  This implies 
that the amount of the single farm payment would not depend anymore on what and how much 
the farmer actually produces.  The single farm payment is, therefore, said to be ‘decoupled’ 
from production.  The reform, however, gives each EU Member State the possibility to choose 
a ‘degree of decoupling’ among different options.  Table 1 shows the likely options of the 2003 
CAP reform envisaged by each Member State, which are taken into account in the reference 
and subsequent EBA simulation scenarios.  A detailed description of the calculation of the 
decoupled premium can be found in Britz et al.  (2002). 
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Table 1  Shares of the direct payments remaining coupled in the reference and EBA 
simulation scenarios by Member State  
 
 
COP  Durum 
wheat  
Suckler 
cow  
Bovine 
slaughter  
Special male  Sheep & goat  
Belgium, 
Luxemburg Austria 
 
Maximum decoupling 
100 % 40 % Maximum decoupling 
Denmark, Finland Maximum decoupling 75 % 50 % 
Spain                
Greece 
Maximum 
decoupling 
40 % 100 % 40 % 50 % 
France 
25 % 
Maximum 
decoupling 
100 % 40 % 
Maximum 
decoupling 
50 % 
Sweden Maximum decoupling 75% 50 % 
Portugal 40 % 100 % 40 % 50 % 
Italy 
Maximum 
decoupling 40 %  100 % 
Maximum 
decoupling 50 % 
Germany 
Netherlands, 
Ireland        
United Kingdom 
Maximum decoupling  
Source: CAPRI modelling system 
In terms of trade policy, the reference scenario takes into account some preferential 
arrangements, particularly the ACP-EC Partnership Agreements of the Cotonou convention, the 
Agreement with India and Balkan countries and the full membership of the former accession 
countries.  For the sugar regime, the reference scenario includes the Regulation no. 1260/2001 
of 19 June 2001 on the sugar CMO (OJL 178, 30.6.2001: p.1) 
The EBA simulation scenarios 
Scenario 1: implementation of quota and duty free access to the 48 Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) as defined by the "Everything But Arms" (EBA) initiative.  The principal aim of this 
first EBA simulation scenario, which reflects the EC’s “status quo” option in the September 
2003 European Commission proposal, is to isolate the impact of this EBA initiative on EU 
supply, demand, trade and prices.  To cope with additional sugar imports triggered by EBA, EU 
A and B sugar quotas are also reduced.  The distribution of this reduction in quotas among 
Member States follows the declassification key defined in the sugar CMO (EC regulation N° 
2038/1993).  This declassification key implies that Member States with a high share of B quota 
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in total quota (e.g., Germany and France) see their quota reduced more proportionally than 
Member States with a low share of B quota (e.g., Spain and United Kingdom). 
Scenario 2: implementation of the EBA initiative combined with a reduction of A and B sugar 
quotas to phase out export subsidies. In addition to the implementation of the EBA initiative, 
this second EBA simulation scenario requires to cut A and B sugar quota until only C sugar is 
exported and all export subsidies are avoided. The quota reduction is again distributed among 
Member States following the declassification key explained above.  
Table 2  Definition of the reference and EBA simulation scenarios  
  Reference (2009) 
"2003 CAP reform"  
Scenario 1  
"EBA" 
Scenario 2 
 "EBA without export 
subsidies" 
CAP reform 
Member State MTR likely implementation - Further decrease in administrative prices  
Modulation implementation 
Production 
quotas  
14592 T  20% cut to reference  42% cut to reference  
Tariffs and TRQ 
for LDCs 
Current WTO commitments Duty and quota free access for LDCs 
Export 
Subsidies 
 Current WTO commitments Elimination   
Scenario 1: EBA initiative (2009) 
Scenario 2: EBA and quota cut to phase out export subsidies (2009)  
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5.2 Results 
Table 3 shows how agricultural area for some selected crops is reallocated in the reference and 
EBA simulation scenarios.  It is apparent that the area of sugar beets, cereals and oilseeds 
decreases in the reference scenario compared to the base year, while the area of potatoes, 
fodder crops, set aside and fallow land increases.  The reduction in the area of  the first three 
crop activities is mainly driven by increasing yields.  The increase in the area of potatoes, 
fodder crops and fallow land  can be partly explained by the implementation of the new scheme 
of the single farm payment that decouples crop premiums. Because these activities can now be 
included in the eligible area for the single farm payment, they become more valuable.  This 
positive effect surely accounts also for the sugar beet area that is also eligible for the single 
farm payment. However, this positive effect on sugar beet area is counter-balanced by (i) the 
quota constraint associated with a positive yield trend between 2001 and 2009 due to technical 
progress and (ii) the drop in real sugar prices as shown in Table 4 (whereas nominal sugar 
prices are basically constant – only slightly decreasing).  Furthermore, the EBA simulation 
scenarios barely affect the area allocation among the selected crops, except sugar beets whose 
acreage drops by 13 and 24% respectively in favour of a slight increase in the area of the other 
crops.  
Table 3  Impact of the reference and EBA simulation scenarios on EU crop area  
Scenario
Base year 
(2001)
Crop 1000 ha 1000 ha
% change 
to base 1000 ha
% change 
to ref 1000 ha
% change 
to "EBA"
Sugar beet 1870 1773 -5.2 1545 -12.9 1167 -24.5
Cereals 37473 34045 -9.1 34114 0.2 34225 0.3
Oilseeds 5319 4971 -6.5 4988 0.3 5018 0.6
Potatoes 1279 1296 1.3 1298 0.2 1302 0.3
Fodder crops 59914 63011 5.2 63092 0.1 63228 0.2
Set aside and 
fallow land 10001 11109 11.1 11158 0.4 11240 0.7
Reference (2009)  
"2003 - CAP reform" "EBA"               
"EBA" without export 
subsidies
 
Source: CAPRI modelling system 
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Table 4 summarises the impacts of the reference and EBA simulation scenarios on the most 
important figures concerning sugar and sugar beets.  The EU sugar price decreases under the 
reference scenario in real terms compared to the base year.  In contrast, the EU sugar price does 
not change much as a result of the EBA simulation scenarios  because EU net sugar supply 
(supply plus imports minus exports) and, consequently, EU sugar demand do not vary.  The 
world market price for sugar slightly decreases under the reference scenario, as well, while it 
increases under the EBA simulation scenarios as a result of a lower world market supply under 
the first EBA scenario and lower EU sugar exports under the second EBA simulation scenario. 
Producer sugar beet prices at the Member State level are linked to the EU and world sugar 
prices as explained in Section 2. The direction of the relative change in the EU producer A, B 
and C sugar beet prices from the base to the reference scenarios corresponds to the change in 
the EU and world sugar prices, as the producer levies are not changing significantly.  Despite 
the drop in EU producer sugar beet prices, sugar beet supply increases.  This can be explained 
by (1) the eligibility of the sugar beet area to the single payment that tends to dampen the fall in 
sugar beet area in response to the drop in the producer sugar beet prices and (2) the yield trend 
between 2001 and 2009. The EU sugar beet supply response in the two EBA simulation 
scenarios is affected by two elements: the changes in sugar beet prices and the changes in sugar 
beet delivery rights.  Although sugar beet supply varies according to quota changes, the 
aggregate sugar beet supply deviates from these quota changes because the sugar module 
allows for different producer types from different regions to vary their quota fill rates.  The 
producer price for A sugar beets now equals the one for B sugar beets because no B sugar is 
exported anymore and, hence, no B levy is needed anymore since the EU supply of sugar under 
quotas A and B is lower than the EU demand for sugar.  C sugar beet supply increases under 
the first EBA simulation scenario compared to the reference because of the increase in the C 
beet price opening the possibility of some sugar beet production previously supplied under the 
sugar quota constraint being supplied as C sugar beets.  Under the second EBA simulation 
scenario compared to the first EBA simulation scenario, C sugar beet supply, however, 
decreases despite the increase in producer sugar beet prices as a result of the further reduction 
in quotas as discussed in Section 4.   
Changes in the EU sugar supply directly follow changes in the EU sugar beet supply and, 
hence, show the same variations.  Generally, the reduction in sugar supply is lower than the 
reduction in sugar quotas. 
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The impacts of quota cuts on sugar beet supply vary among Member States because of the 
differences in production costs and price transmissions and the declassification key.  At a first 
look, it is surprising to observe that Member States that are known to be more competitive in 
sugar beet production like France, Germany and Austria, show the largest relative drop in sugar 
beet supply of all Member States.  The main reason lays in the declassification key enforced in 
the distribution of the quota reduction among Member States.  This key imposes above average 
reductions on Member States with high B quotas.   
The sugar quota cuts result from the EBA agreement for the first EBA simulation scenario and 
the elimination of exports subsidies in the second EBA simulation scenario.  Both quota cuts 
impose a reduction in the EU sugar supply.  As expected, the simulation of the EBA initiative 
only leads to an increase in EU sugar imports of 2.5 Mio tons compared to the reference 
scenario, which originate from LDCs.  Coupling the EBA initiative with an elimination of EU 
export subsidies further increase those EU sugar imports because of a slight increase in the EU 
sugar price.  In the reference and first EBA simulation scenarios, the increases in sugar exports 
are linked to the increases in C sugar supply because the only outlet for C sugar is the world 
market.  In the second EBA simulation scenario, the elimination of EU export subsidies further 
decreases sugar exports and all EU sugar exports correspond to C sugar here.  The further 
reduction in sugar quota in the second EBA simulation scenario has almost no impact on EU 
sugar demand compared to the first EBA simulation scenario since the EU sugar price hardly 
varies. 
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Table 4  Impacts of the reference and EBA simulation scenarios on the EU sugar sector 
 
Base year 
(2001)
Unita value value
% change 
to base value
% change 
to ref value
% change 
to "EBA"
A sugar beet
producer price €/t 51.45 48.86 -5.0 51.02 4.4 51.12 0.2
production 1000t 78010 78308 0.4 63404 -19.0 46492 -26.7
B sugar beet  
producer price €/t 42.45 39.16 -7.8 51.02 30.3 51.12 0.2
production 1000t 15473 16012 3.5 12928 -19.3 8978 -30.6
C sugar beet
producer price €/t 15.94 14.33 -10.1 15.31 6.8 15.6 1.9
production 1000t 13470 15365 14.1 18903 23.0 15823 -16.3
Sugar beet total
average price €/t 46.05 39.24 -14.8 37.69 -4.0 37.15 -1.4
production 1000t 106953 109685 2.6 95235 -13.2 71293 -25.1
EU price €/t 696 667 -4.2 671 0.6 672 0.2
World market price €/t 204 194 -5.2 204 5.5 208 1.9
Quota 1000t 14592 14592 0.0 11688 -19.9 8450 -27.7
Domestic supply 1000t 15917 16312 2.5 14145 -13.3 10561 -25.3
Belgium 1000t 895 910 1.7 770 -15.4 601 -21.9
Denmark 1000t 517 525 1.7 443 -15.7 305 -31.2
Germany 1000t 4219 4226 0.2 3492 -17.4 2293 -34.3
Greece 1000t 327 328 0.3 312 -5.0 270 -13.6
Spain 1000t 1028 1045 1.7 991 -5.2 908 -8.3
France 1000t 4141 4330 4.6 3733 -13.8 2625 -29.7
Ireland 1000t 211 213 1.0 194 -9.0 166 -14.1
Italy 1000t 1376 1480 7.6 1316 -11.1 1037 -21.2
Netherlands 1000t 830 840 1.3 695 -17.4 494 -28.9
Austria 1000t 437 444 1.6 388 -12.7 289 -25.6
Portugal 1000t 78 77 -1.2 74 -4.7 65 -11.5
Sweden 1000t 418 424 1.5 396 -6.6 342 -13.7
Finland 1000t 146 151 3.4 143 -5.3 124 -13.4
United Kingdom 1000t 1295 1317 1.7 1199 -8.9 1044 -13.0
Imports 1000t 1734 1755 1.2 4239 141.6 4457 5.1
ACPb 1000t 989 999 1.0 999 0.0 999 0.0
LDCs 1000t 646 652 1.0 3137 381.0 3354 6.9
India 1000t 16 20 26.7 20 -1.7 20 0.3
Other regionsb 1000t 83 83 0.9 83 0.0 83 0.0
Total supply 1000t 17651 18067 2.4 18384 1.8 15017 -18.3
Domestic demand 1000t 12947 12954 0.0 12952 0.0 12922 -0.2
Exports 1000t 4704 5113 8.7 5348 4.6 2111 -60.5
Total demand 1000t 17651 18067 2.4 18301 1.3 15033 -17.9
"EBA"
"EBA without export 
subsidies
Reference (2009)  
"2003 - CAP reform"
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(a)     Monetary values for 2009 are deflated to be expressed in constant 2001 prices. 
(b)     Not including LDC countries belonging to that aggregate. 
Source: CAPRI modelling system 
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Regional differences in supply changes among Member States reflect differences in 
competitiveness which can be apparent from their marginal costs and differences in C sugar 
share in total sugar supply as well.  These regional differences are illustrated in Figure 5 for 
Germany from the results of the first EBA simulation scenario compared to the reference 
scenario. 
Figure 5 Relative changes in regional sugar beet supply from the ‘EBA’ initiative for 
Germany (%) 
 
  Source: Capri modelling system 
The darker the region is shaded, the greater is the relative reduction in sugar beet supply.  The 
scale ranges from -16% (bright) to -20% (dark).  The relative quota cut is the same for all 
regions within a Member State and amounts to 37% for Germany. According to these results, 
regions in Southern and Eastern Germany show the lowest reduction in sugar beet supply while 
the Middle Western part of Germany is more affected.  These differences largely depend on the 
assumed marginal costs for beet supply in those regions that are derived from Bureau et al. 
(1997).  The results are hence in line with those from Bureau et al. (1997) and Mahler (1994) as 
well.  Regional differences are observed across all Member States in all scenarios and can 
mostly be explained by differences in marginal costs given in Table A1 of the Annex.  
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Impact of the reference and simulation scenarios on EU welfare and the FEOGA budget  
Compared to the base year, the "2003 CAP reform" of the reference scenario leads, as shown in 
Table 5, to (i) a decrease of 17% in real budget outlays under the so-called first pillar of the 
CAP , (ii) an increase of 4% in consumer surplus due to the decrease in import and consumer 
prices of major products such as meat, cereals, sugar and milk products, (iii) a decrease of 7% 
in real agricultural income owing to the long-term price trends and administrative price 
adjustments, and (vi) an increase of 4% in EU welfare, as consumer gain is greater than 
producer loss.  The fall in the real budget outlays stems from a drop in real administrative 
prices and export subsidies. In nominal terms, the budget outlays stay, however, almost 
constant. 
Table 5  Impact of reference and EBA simuilation scenarios on EU welfare (Mio Euro) a 
 
Base year 
(2001)
Mio € Mio €
% change 
to base Mio €
% change 
to ref Mio €
% change 
to "EBA"
EU Budged 37793 31301 -17.2 31822 1.7 31492 -1.0
Consumer Surplus 4519175 4703412 4.1 4703489 0.0 4703008 0.0
Agricultural Income 147522 137354 -6.9 136799 -0.4 136087 -0.5
from sugar beets 3365 3232 -3.9 2630 -18.6 1911 -27.3
EU Welfare 4685971 4868164 3.9 4867163 0.0 4866305 0.0
Reference (2009)  
"2003 - CAP reform" "EBA"
"EBA without export 
subsidies
(a)     Monetary values for 2009 are deflated to be expressed in constant 2001 prices.. 
Source: CAPRI modelling system 
As shown in Table 5, both EBA simulation scenarios lead to a very low welfare loss for the EU 
compared to the reference scenario.  Agricultural income is negatively but moderately affected 
due to the modest contribution of sugar beets to agricultural income as a whole.  The additional 
quota cut of 28% of the second EBA simulation scenario appears to be clearly unfavourable for 
sugar beet growers since it induces a additional income loss of 27%.  Consumer surplus 
remains almost unchanged because the demand and the consumer prices of the major products 
are practically not affected by the changes in the sugar CMO resulting from the EBA 
simulation scenarios. The very small increase in the EU sugar price and the small decreases in 
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EU prices for the other products turn to cancel out almost completely.  Budget outlays slightly 
increase under the first EBA simulation scenario because subsidised sugar exports are now 
completely financed by the FEOGA, not by the levy mechanism anymore, and they decrease in 
the second EBA simulation scenario because export subsidies are no longer used.  In sum, both 
EBA simulation scenarios lead to minor changes for EU agriculture as a whole.  But, 
agricultural incomes from sugar beets, including quota rents, considerably drop, particularly 
under the second EBA simulation scenario. 
Comparison with results from other studies  
The results from this study are now compared to results from other similar studies.  Because 
most of these available studies do not take into account the EBA initiative, we compare the 
pourcentage changes in key variables induced by the quota cut of the second EBA simulation 
scenario with respect to the first EBA simulation scenario, to the pourcentage changes induced 
by quota cuts reported in these other studies.  Becausse the policy context of this study is 
different from the policy context of these other studies, the comparaison is fragile. 
Table 6: Impact of quota cut on the EU sugar market in selected studies 
 
∆ Quota cut 
(%) 
∆ supply 
(%) 
∆ demand 
(%) 
∆ net trade 
[mio T] 
∆ World price 
(%) 
Sheales et al.  1999 
Poonyth et al.  2000 
Frandsen et al.  2003a 
Adenäuer et al.  2004  
- 8.2 
- 9.6 
- 13.1 
-28.0 
-2.8 
-3.2 
-1.2 
-25.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-0.20 
-0.5 
-0.55 
-0.21 
-2.35 
3.67 
9.10 
0.47 
1.90 
(a)    Net trade effects estimated from percentage changes in trade values applied to 1997 FAO trade quantity data.      
        World price change is the average price change in Australia, Thailand and Brazil. 
Key results on the market impact of the second EBA simulation scenario are assembled in 
Table 6 together with the results from other recent and comparable studies.  Results from these 
studies show that at most one third of a given quota cut is transmitted into a decline in sugar 
supply, implying that C sugar supply rises correspondingly.  Nonetheless, results from this 
study show a stronger response in sugar supply from a quota cut  than the other studies.  This 
stronger supply response in this study reflects the representation of additional motives in the 
sugar beet grower’s behaviour to supply sugar beets explained in Section 4 and modelled by a 
virtual quota mark up.  From all studies, demand for sugar is consistently very unresponsive to 
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quota cut since consumer prices do hardly not change.  The increase in world market price 
associated with policy curbing net exports from the EU is at the lower end of the range spanned 
by the other available studies.  Because of the differences between these reported studies in 
terms of modelling, assumptions and data, in particular with respect to the determination of the 
sugar marginal cost in each Member State, the comparison of the results of this study with the 
other available studies should be considered tentative.   
6 Conclusions  
This study contributes in several aspects to the understanding of the EU sugar regime and the 
impacts of reforming it.  First of all, the study shows that farm heterogeneity cannot be 
neglected given the limited tradability of quotas. This heterogeneity helps explain the size of 
the aggregate C sugar supply and the responsiveness of this aggregate sugar beet supply to 
quota and price variations. Second, several hypotheses about production indivisibility and 
uncertainty are brought together implying that C sugar supply is economically stimulated by 
support given to the quota sugar. As this also applies to joint production in general, we may 
leave apart the question whether this is a case of cross subsidisation or not. 
Both farm level heterogeneity and behaviour are used to focus the analysis on two scenarios: 1) 
implementation of the EBA initiative and 2) implementation of the EBA initiative with a 
progressive reduction in production quotas to phase out sugar export subsidies. The impact 
analysis shows that both policy reform scenarios affect the EU welfare and overall agricultural 
income only slightly but the EU agricultural income from sugar beets more significantly.  EU 
sugar supply, trade and regional supply distribution are mainly affected while EU sugar 
demand remains unchanged.  EU sugar imports increase, particularly from LDCs, while EU 
sugar exports decrease.  The quota and duty free access for LDCs plays a major role in trade of 
the products that are considered in the model.   
The treatment of the sugar and food industry in the sugar module involves several 
simplifications pointing to possible areas for future research.  First of all, it was  impossible to 
collect sufficient information on all relevant aspects of the sugar industry conduct (e.g., in 
terms of delivery right managment, sugar beet price negotiation, cost control and sale strategy).  
The price linkage between beet and sugar prices at the wholesale and consumer level is, 
therefore, not derived from an explicit optimisation framework.  This also implies that the 
regional supply programming models do not optimise the regional distribution of the 
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processing capacity to the extent that regional impacts of a quota cut might lead to a complete 
retreat of sugar beet supply in some regions in favour of others.   
Addressing these simplifications is likely to become more relevant in the long run which points 
to another limitation of the analysis.  Impacts are estimated for 2009 but the adjustment process 
is likely to be dynamic.  In the long run, investment decisions in EU agriculture and sugar 
industry, in preferentially treated LDCs and other regions are likely to lead  to additional 
adjustment possibilities.  The initial EU quota cut policy would not be sustainable without 
additional quota cuts over time because the eventual sugar yield growth in EBA beneficiary 
countries is most likely to increase further EU preferential imports in the longer run. 
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8 Annex 
8.1 The CAPRI simulation model:  an overview 
The regionalised agricultural sector modelling system "CAPRI" is designed as a projection and 
simulation tool for the European agricultural sector based on: 
1. A physical consistency framework, covering balances for agricultural area, young animals 
and feed requirements for animals as well as nutrient requirement for crops, realised as 
constraints in the regional supply models.  
2. Economic accounting principles according to the definition of the Economic Accounts for 
Agriculture (EAA).  The model covers all outputs and inputs included in the national EAAs 
for the 15 Member States, and the revenues and costs are broken down consistently to 
NUTS 2 regions and production activities. 
3. A detailed policy description, capturing all relevant payment schemes with their 
respective ceilings on the supply side and covering tariffs, intervention purchases and 
subsidised exports on the market side.  The policy of non-EU world regions is based on 
OECD PSE/CSE data bank. 
4. Behavioural functions and allocation steering strictly in line with micro-economic theory.  
Functional forms are chosen to be globally well behaved, allowing for a consistent welfare 
analysis. 
The model distinguishes a supply and market modules, which are iteratively coupled.  The 
interplay of the modules is shown in Figure A.1.  The supply module consists of aggregate 
programming models at NUTS 2 level, working with exogenous prices defined at Member 
State level during each iteration.  After being solved, the regional results of the NUTS 2 supply 
models – crop areas, herd sizes, input/output coefficients, etc. – are aggregated to Member 
State level.  Member State models build with an identical structure as the NUTS II models are 
then calibrated to the aggregated results of the NUTS II models.  Next, young animal prices are 
determined by linking together these Member State models.  Afterwards, supply and feed 
demand functions of the market module are calibrated to prices of the current iteration and 
aggregated Member State results on feed use and supply.  The market module is solved.  
Producer prices at Member State level, as calculated by the market module, drive the next 
iteration with the supply module.  Equally, in between iterations, premiums for the activities 
are adjusted if ceilings are overshot according to the results laid down in the Common Market 
Organisations (CMOs).  More detailed information on the CAPRI system are available on the 
following web page: 
http://www.agp.uni-bonn.de/agpo/rsrch/capri/capri_e.htm.  
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Figure A. 1.  Linkages between the supply and the market modules of CAPRI 
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Source:  CAPRI modelling system 
8.2 Determination of sugar beet marginal costs per EU NUTS 2 region and producer 
type 
A complete matrix of sugar beet marginal costs by NUTS 2 region and producer type is derived 
from marginal costs provided by Bureau et al. (1997) and Frandsen et al. (2003) using 
additional assumptions captured with a standard maximum entropy estimation.  Bureau et al. 
(1997) provide opportunity costs for beet growing calculated for the most important producing 
regions of the EU-15, except for Austria, Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden, but 
considering a single technology per region.  Frandsen et al. (2003) provide marginal costs 
estimated for every entire Member State considering also a single technology per state.  First, 
we need to determine a likely marginal cost for the missing regions and Member States.  For 
the missing regions of Member States considered in Bureau et al. (1997), a national average 
value of marginal costs is used.  For missing Austria, the average value of marginal costs of 
Germany is used.  For missing Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden, the marginal costs 
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estimated in Frandsen et al. (2003) for these four States are weighted by the average value from 
all the Bureau et al.'s estimates over the average value from all the Frandsen et al.'s estimates. 
Then, a standard maximum entropy approach is used to derive the marginal cost of each 
producer type for every region or Member State of EU-15.  For each producer type, two 
support points are defined according to Table A.1, following the intuitive assumptions that: 
1. the marginal cost of producers supplying less than their allocated quota A (Aund) ranges 
between A beet price and the average of A and B beet prices, 
2. the marginal cost of producers just supplying the allocated quota A (Abind) ranges between 
A and B beet prices, 
3. the marginal cost of producers supplying less than their allocated quota A and B (Bund) 
ranges between the average of A and B beet prices and the average of B and C beet prices, 
4. the marginal cost of producers just supplying the allocated quota A and B (Bind) ranges 
between B and C beet prices, 
5. the marginal cost of producers supplying more than their allocated quota A and B (Cprod) 
ranges between the average of A and B prices and C beet price. 
 
Table A.1.  Maximum entropy support points for marginal costs 
Support Point 1 Support Point 2
Aund Pa 0.5(Pa +Pb)
Abind Pa Pb
Bund 0.5(Pa+Pb) 0.5(Pb+Pc)
Bbind Pb Pc
Cprod 0.5(Pb+Pc) Pc
 
Restrictions to the maximum entropy problem include that the average of the marginal costs 
over producer types for one specific region or Member State equals the marginal cost 
determined for that region or Member State, and the following order of magnitude of marginal 
costs (MC) is respected for every region or Member State: 
MC(Aund) > MC(Abind) > MC(Bund) > MC(Bbind) > MC(Cprod) 
Final marginal costs per producer type for all NUTS 2 regions determined by this maximum 
entropy problem in combination with the application of an additional quota mark up as 
described in Section 4 are reported in Table A.2.  Marginal costs are reported for regions when 
they differ from the national ones, and only for observed producer types. 
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Table A.2.  Regional marginal costs of sugar beet production 
 
Cprod Bbind Bund Abind Aund Cprod Bbind Bund Abind Aund
DANMARK 23.8 30.8 48.8   FRANCE 26.7 30.2 38.7   
DEUTSCHLAND 21.2 23.6 42.1   ILE DE FRANCE 25.9 30.3    
BRANDENBURG 20.0 22.2 37.4   NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS 26.7 30.4    
MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN 21.0 24.3 54.4   CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 21.8 33.1 43.0   
SACHSEN 20.6 22.9 56.1   PICARDIE 29.9 33.2    
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 20.8 23.5 33.4   HAUTE-NORMANDIE 26.6 30.9    
THUERINGEN 20.9 24.5 41.9   CENTRE 25.8 30.2 33.6   
STUTTGART 21.0 24.2 50.6   BASSE-NORMANDIE 29.3 32.6    
KARLSRUHE 21.0 24.2 50.6   BOURGOGNE 25.9 31.4    
FREIBURG 21.0 24.2 50.6   LORRAINE 26.8     
TUEBINGEN 21.0 24.2 50.6   ALSACE 26.8 32.7    
OBERBAYERN 18.8 26.3 46.0   FRANCHE-COMTE  26.8    
NIEDERBAYERN 18.8 26.3 46.0   PAYS DE LA LOIRE 26.7 30.2 39.0   
OBERPFALZ 18.8 26.3 46.0   RHONE-ALPES 26.7 30.2 39.0   
OBERFRANKEN 18.8 26.3 46.0   AUVERGNE 23.2 31.1    
MITTELFRANKEN 18.8 26.3 46.0   IRELAND 32.4 42.0 55.0   
UNTERFRANKEN 18.8 26.3 46.0   ITALIA 27.3 39.4 43.8   
SCHWABEN 18.8 26.3 46.0   LOMBARDIA 27.8 39.4 43.8   
DARMSTADT 20.8 23.1 41.5   EMILIA-ROMAGNA 26.8 39.4 43.8   
GIESSEN 20.8 23.1 41.5   LAZIO  39.4    
KASSEL 20.8 23.1 41.5   CAMPANIA 27.3 39.4 43.8   
BRAUNSCHWEIG 26.9 33.5 45.5   SARDEGNA 26.7 39.4 43.4   
HANNOVER 26.9 33.5 45.5   PIEMONTE 26.8 39.4    
LUENEBURG 26.9 33.5 45.5   VENETO 27.5 39.4 43.7   
WESER-EMS 26.9 33.5 45.5   FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA 37.1 39.4 43.8   
DUESSELDORF 22.9 25.5 49.5   TOSCANA 26.9 39.4 43.8   
KOELN 22.9 25.5 49.5   UMBRIA 26.8 39.4 43.8   
MUENSTER 22.9 25.5 49.5   MARCHE 26.9 39.4 43.7   
DETMOLD 22.9 25.5 49.5   ABRUZZO 27.8 39.4 39.4   
ARNSBERG 22.9 25.5 49.5   MOLISE  39.4 39.5   
KOBLENZ 18.9 21.0 43.7   PUGLIA 39.4 39.4 43.8   
TRIER 18.9 21.0 43.7   BASILICATA 27.3 39.4 43.8   
RHEINHESSEN-PFALZ 18.9 21.0 43.7   CALABRIA 38.5 39.4    
DESSAU 20.4 22.8 36.8   NEDERLAND 28.0 36.2 49.6   
HALLE 20.4 22.8 36.8   OESTERREICH 23.7 28.4 41.9   
MAGDEBURG 20.4 22.8 36.8   PORTUGAL    55.7 61.9
ELLADA     32.0 SVERIGE 26.7 38.4  48.0 0.0
ESPANA 33.6 37.8 54.6   SUOMI/FINLAND  41.5  51.9 55.2
MADRID 33.5 37.9 55.3   UNITED KINGDOM 30.3 43.9    
PAIS VASCO  37.9 45.3   North West (including Merseyside) 29.6 50.8    
NAVARRA 33.5 37.9 55.3   Yorkshire and The Humber 29.6 50.8    
RIOJA 33.7 37.4 55.3   East Midlands 30.4 44.2    
ARAGON 33.5 37.9 55.3   West Midlands 31.3 57.9    
CASTILLA-LEON 32.6 36.3 50.7   Eastern 30.4 44.2    
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA 33.3 42.3 55.5   South East 30.4 44.2    
EXTREMADURA  38.5    South West 31.3 57.9    
ANDALUCIA  39.0 55.5   Wales 30.3 43.9    
MURCIA 33.5 37.9 55.3   BELGIQUE-BELGIE 28.0 32.7 53.2   
 
Source:  Own estimations using Bureau et al. (1997) and Frandsen et al. (2003) 
 
